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eXeCUTIVe SUMMARY  |
As violent crime declined across the United states after 1995, the 
number of young offenders placed in secure correctional facilities also 
fell, but not in every state and not to the same degree. the crime rate 
and youth incarceration are not linked in the way that many people 
expect. Incarceration sometimes fluctuates in concert with crime rates 
and sometimes it does not. often, the two diverge entirely.
the scale of incarceration is not simply a reaction to crime. it is a 
policy choice. Some lawmakers invest heavily in youth confinement 
facilities. In their jurisdictions, incarceration is a key component of the 
youth justice system. Other lawmakers invest more in community-
based programs. In their view, costly confinement should be reserved 
for chronic and seriously violent offenders. 
These choices are critical for budgets and for safety. If officials spend 
too much on incarceration, they will eventually lack the resources to 
operate a diversified and well-balanced justice system. Correctional 
institutions and the high costs associated with incarceration will begin 
to dominate fiscal and programmatic decision making. 
A number of states recognized this problem as early as the 1960s 
and 1970s. in california, Pennsylvania, and wisconsin, legislators 
and administrators created innovative policies to reduce the demand 
for expensive state confinement and to supervise as many young 
offenders as possible in their own communities. during the 1990s, 
north carolina, ohio, and oregon implemented similar reforms. 
the reform strategies adopted by these states are known by different 
names, but they generally rely on three sources of influence: 
resolution (direct managerial influence over system behavior); 
reinvestment (financial incentives to change system behavior); and 
realignment (organizational and structural modifications to alter 
system behavior). 
this report reviews the history and development of these strategies 
and analyzes their impact on policy, practice, and public safety. 
All three strategies have been used effectively to reform juvenile 
justice systems, but this report suggests that realignment may be the 
best choice for sustaining reform over the long term. Reform strategies 
in juvenile justice are sustainable when they cannot be easily reversed 
by future policymakers facing different budgetary conditions and 
changing political environments. 
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INTRODUCTION  |
Juvenile justice is changing. The declining crime rate is partly 
responsible. when crime rates fall, the politics of crime begin to cool 
and policymakers have greater freedom to innovate. several states are 
taking advantage of the opportunity presented by decreasing crime 
to reconsider the role of incarceration in juvenile justice. Building on 
reforms from the 1970s and 1980s, lawmakers are finding that youth 
confinement costs can be lowered without endangering public safety. 
The number of youth in secure confinement has been declining as a 
result—even in texas. the new York times published an editorial in 
2011 congratulating Texas officials for their leadership and “thoughtful, 
decisive action” in moving the state away from the “prison model” 
of juvenile justice (July 9, 2011). The editors cited the state’s $100 
million investment in community-based programs and lauded the 
fact that the Texas “youth inmate” population dropped more than 60 
percent since 2006. other articles and editorials have praised recent 
reforms in california, illinois, missouri, and ohio. 
these reforms did not begin with the recent crime decline, but 
falling crime rates allow lawmakers to increase their focus on cost-
effectiveness and the impact of juvenile justice policy. Down-sizing 
corrections is now a central theme in a growing number of juvenile 
justice systems (National Juvenile Justice Network 2011). Do these 
changes represent a permanent shift in policy and practice, or are 
they merely a temporary reaction to tight budgets and low rates of 
violent crime? will policymakers maintain the reforms if crime rises 
and budgets rebound? some of the political conservatives who fueled 
the get-tough movement of the 1990s now endorse policies that keep 
incarceration to a minimum. can advocates trust these new partners 
over time? Can today’s reforms be “locked down” to survive the 
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After 1995, violent crime rates declined among all age groups
Data source: Estimates calculated by John Jay College using data from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
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The number of juvenile offenders in residential facilities declined in most states between 2000 and 2008
Percent change in juvenile residential facility populations: 2000-2008
Source: Hockenberry (2011).
Data Source: Juvenile Residential Facility Census 2000 and 2008 [machine-readable files]. OJJDP [producer]. Census Bureau [collector].
Note: Numbers in parentheses represent each state’s total residential population on the 2008 census day.
National Total: 
The total number of offenders in 
juvenile residential facilities fell 
26% between 2000 and 2008.
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POLICY CONTeXT  |
state and local policymakers across the United states are closing 
once crowded youth confinement facilities. In a growing number of 
jurisdictions, incarceration is no longer an automatic response for all 
types of juvenile law violations. States are increasing their investments 
in alternatives to incarceration, especially for young offenders. these 
changes are supported by breakthroughs in the science of brain 
development, the increasing reliability of evaluation research on 
delinquency interventions, and opinions by the U.s. supreme court 
recognizing the special nature of adolescence. 
local governments and private providers are also taking on more 
responsibility for juvenile justice. Traditionally, juvenile confinement 
was managed by states while alternatives (not involving confinement) 
were managed by local governments. Under that system, locally 
managed programs suffered from low levels of financial and political 
support. It was cost-effective for city and county governments to send 
large numbers of youthful offenders to state institutions because, 
unlike community programs, confinement costs were paid by the 
state. this led to excessive reliance on incarceration and higher 
costs, but it did not improve public safety. the best research shows 
that incarceration by itself does not reduce recidivism (mulvey et al. 
2010), and it may exacerbate other youth problems, including poor 
educational outcomes, unemployment, and behavioral health issues 






 Number of juveniles in residential facilities: U.S. totals
Juvenile offender populations declined more in public than in private 
facilities between 2000 and 2008
Source: Hockenberry (2011).
Data Source: Juvenile Residential Facility Census 2000 and 2008 [machine-readable files]. OJJDP [producer]. 
Census Bureau [collector].
Public Facilities (down 28%)
Private Facilities (down 24%)
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tHe Role oF secURe conFinement
The scale of confinement in the juvenile justice system is not simply 
a function of the rate and severity of juvenile crime. It is a product 
of numerous policy decisions made by lawmakers, budget officials, 
and justice practitioners. Actions taken by state legislators, judges, 
prosecutors, police officials, probation workers, and correctional facility 
administrators determine how many and what type of offenders are 
seen as suitable for confinement.
Some juveniles, such as those charged with violent offenses or those 
with lengthy court records, are confined based solely on the severity 
and extent of their illegal behavior. these youth, however, rarely make 
up a sizeable portion of all confined youth. Many juveniles are placed 
in secure confinement for reasons other than the offense(s) with which 
they were charged. these reasons might include the perceived support 
provided by a youth’s family, the availability and cost of alternative 
supervision and treatment resources, the proximity of the juvenile’s 
home to such alternatives, and their reputation for effectiveness. 
Debates over the proper use of youth confinement have bedeviled 
juvenile justice policy in the United States for more than a century, at 
least since the juvenile court reformers of the Progressive Era ques-
tioned the wisdom of placing delinquent youths in 19th Century “hous-
es of refuge” (Mennel 1973; Platt 1969). Since the very beginnings 
of the juvenile justice era, reformers have tried to reduce the scale of 
institutional confinement by expanding the quality and availability of 
community-based alternatives.
Researchers also question the effectiveness of institutional 
confinement. Studies have shown for decades that institutional 
settings for youth involve an inherent conflict between control and 
treatment. The organizational subculture of confinement may actually 
breed violence rather than suppress it (Feld 1981). 
Juvenile correctional institutions often do not live up to their name. in 
one of the most comprehensive studies of youthful offenders to date, 
researchers followed more than 1,300 serious adolescent offenders 
for seven years after their appearances in court (mulvey et al. 2010). 
the results showed that the frequency of youth offending declined 
over time with maturation, and the length of time an offender spent in 
institutional settings did not contribute much to the rate of decline. 
A recent meta-analytical review of group care settings for children and 
youth found no evidence that congregate care programs for court-
involved youth were more effective in changing youth behavior and 
reducing recidivism than were programs delivering similar services in 
family-like, community-based settings (Lee et al. 2011). 
more incarceration does not equal less recidivism. Placing youth in 
large, group confinement facilities does not seem to be justified from 
the perspective of treatment effectiveness or the prevention of future 
recidivism. 
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So, why has secure confinement remained the default disposition 
for so many juvenile offenders for so long? There are at least four 
reasons: 
1) incapacitation— Despite the rehabilitative rhetoric of the juvenile 
justice system, what some people really want is for offenders to be 
off their streets and out of their neighborhoods, if only for a few 
months or years.  even if research shows that incarceration does not 
reduce the overall crime rate, policymakers and the public may prefer 
confinement because it addresses our emotional needs for safety. 
2) Retribution— Again, despite the treatment rhetoric of juvenile 
justice, placing a youth in secure confinement demonstrates the 
community’s disapproval of illegal behavior. In other words, the 
juvenile justice system confines some youthful offenders because they 
“deserve it.” In policy circles, this is often called “accountability.”
3) convenience— Confinement just might be easier. There are 
economies of scale to be gained from large facilities, in terms of food 
service, educational programming, transportation, medical costs, and 
other supports and activities for youth. Policymakers may conclude 
that it is easier to operate a few large institutions rather than many 
smaller programs in the community.
4) isomorphism— Sociologists use the term “isomorphism” to 
describe the processes that lead organizations within the same 
sector to resemble one another over time, not because the dominant 
structure is demonstrably effective but because it is advantageous for 
bureaucracies to fit in rather than to stand out (DiMaggio and Powell 
1983).  In other words, confinement may be the preferred policy for 
youthful offenders in part due to our own lack of imagination. 
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   Complicated Systems Require Complicated Reforms
no single set of policies and practices controls what happens to a young 
person arrested for violating the law. no national rules govern whether 
the case should result in formal charges or be diverted from prosecution. 
no established principles identify if the youth should be supervised in the 
community or placed in a secure facility. these important decisions are 
left to state and local officials and even to individual practitioners, and 
this leads to considerable variation in the structure and management of 
juvenile justice systems.
in the United states, every state government, and sometimes every local 
government, decides for itself how to organize and operate the juvenile 
justice system. Each jurisdiction chooses how to divide the responsibility 
for handling young offenders among a broad network of law enforcement 
agencies, prosecutors, defense attorneys, juvenile and family courts, 
probation agencies, correctional institutions, detention centers, treatment 
providers, voluntary organizations, and youth advocates. Added to this 
mix are the school officials and behavioral health providers who often 
work hand-in-hand with the juvenile justice system but are not part of it.
when a young person is suspected of engaging in illegal behavior, 
what happens next can be complicated and unpredictable. A law 
enforcement agency must first decide whether to make an arrest or to 
handle the matter informally and within the family. next, and usually 
with the approval of a court, the police or prosecutor or some type of 
administrative agency decides whether the youth should be held (or 
“detained”) pending court processing. 
the prosecutor (or sometimes an administrative agency) then decides 
whether to file charges (or “petition”) against the youth, and if not, 
whether to refer the matter for informal supervision and social services. 
If prosecuted, the youth may end up in court facing a judge who might 
make one final attempt to get the youth and family to agree to an 
informal service plan. Failing that, the court will determine whether the 
facts of the case merit adjudication (a legal finding of “delinquency”), and 
if so, what type of response (or “disposition”) should be ordered.
All of these decisions may have a profound effect on the young person 
and his or her family, but the most dramatic and expensive decision is 
made at the end of the process, when the court chooses the “disposition” 
for each case. this is when the court decides whether its plan for the 
youth should involve some period of confinement, or in the vernacular of 
juvenile justice, whether the youth should be “placed out of the home.”   
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THRee MODeLS OF ReFORM  |
All juvenile justice systems need some confinement facilities. Even 
with the best efforts of families, communities and organizations, 
confinement will always be a potential part of the response to youth 
crime. The question addressed here is how confinement resources 
should be managed. In the past, secure confinement was staffed and 
operated by state governments, while non-confinement services and 
community-based programs were managed locally. 
incarceration is costly and it is not guaranteed to reduce recidivism 
or deter future crime. In the juvenile justice system, the average cost 
of incarcerating one juvenile in a state facility may reach $100,000 
per year and sometimes even $250,000 (New York State Juvenile 
Justice Advisory Group 2010). The financial burdens of incarceration 
alone attract states to any strategy for reducing the scale of juvenile 
confinement and shifting young offenders into community programs. 
today, a growing number of states see the need for a localized, more 
flexible juvenile justice system that provides confinement when 
necessary, but only if and when other services and sanctions are 
clearly inappropriate, and only if the confinement facility is close to the 
offender’s home so that family ties may be maintained and community 
reentry and aftercare planning can be effective. 
there are a number of strategies for introducing this approach in 
juvenile justice systems that are still dependent on state-operated 
confinement facilities. This report proposes three basic strategies: 
1) resolution, 2) reinvestment; and 3) realignment. The rest of the 
report describes these approaches and how juvenile justice systems 
have used them to reform practices and policies related to secure 
confinement for youthful offenders. 
ResolUtion models
Resolution is the oldest and most traditional method of changing the 
justice system. Resolution approaches rely on leadership, managerial 
influence, and will power. The most prominent reform efforts of the 
1970s and 1980s depended on the resolve of administrators and 
elected officials. In Massachusetts and Utah, for example, justice 
administrators worked with elected officials to reduce reliance on 
secure facilities and to move young offenders into community-based 
programs and smaller, home-like settings. More recently, juvenile 
justice leaders in Missouri used the resolution strategy to remake 
that state’s approach to long-term placement for young offenders. 
their efforts demonstrate that the resolve of administrators and 
policymakers can be a powerful force for reform. 
In the 1960s, the Massachusetts juvenile justice system depended 
on a few large confinement facilities to deal with juvenile offenders. 
The facilities served as an incentive to use confinement in local 
jurisdictions throughout the Commonwealth. In 1969, however, state 
leaders selected an ambitious and capable agent of change to run the 
massachusetts department of Youth services (miller 1991).
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In a few years, Jerome “Jerry” Miller and his team closed the state’s 
large juvenile facilities and developed a network of community-based 
programs to take their place. Research showed that youth served 
in the community had levels of recidivism no worse than youth who 
were previously incarcerated in massachusetts (ohlin, miller, and 
Coates 1977). In a follow-up study, the National Council on Crime and 
Delinquency confirmed that the state’s community-based approach 
protected public safety as well as the previous incarceration-focused 
system but at less cost (krisberg, Austin and steele 1989).
In the mid-1970s, political leaders in Utah faced their own juvenile 
correctional crisis. Utah’s one large juvenile facility, the State Industrial 
school, was ineffective and dangerous. lawyers representing the 
state’s youth filed a suit based on the facility’s poor condition. 
in search of alternative approaches, and encouraged by Federal 
assistance, state officials closed the training school and reduced 
the number of secure beds statewide from 350 to 60. Community-
based programs and a limited number of small residential treatment 
units were used to supervise juveniles in their own communities. 
Researchers who examined the Utah experience later concluded 
that shifting juvenile justice away from incarceration and toward 
community-based programs did not worsen public safety and actually 
may have reduced subsequent criminal behavior (krisberg 2005).
since the massachusetts and Utah reforms, other states have 
employed resolution-based strategies for reducing the use of 
confinement institutions. The most heralded of these is the “Missouri 
Model” (Mendel 2010). During the past 20 years, Missouri officials 
moved hundreds of youth out the state’s traditional juvenile 
corrections facilities and into community-based services and 
small, regionally distributed residential programs. the state also 
reconceptualized its approach to intervention, developing a model 
focused on youth development and behavioral change in family-like 
settings. 
enacting reform with simple resolve is an obvious strategy, and the 
accomplishments of massachusetts, Utah, and missouri show that 
it can work. Achieving reform with managerial resolution, however, 
means that ongoing resolution is necessary to sustain reform. For this 
reason, a number of states expanded their reform strategies to include 
more durable forces: financial incentives and structural realignment.
ReinVestment models
Reinvestment refers to the use of financial incentives to encourage 
state and local governments to reduce spending on confinement and 
to invest in community-based programs. In the adult justice system, 
reinvestment strategies are promoted as a general method for 
increasing public safety and controlling costs (la Vigne et al. 2010). 
A number of states developed reinvestment initiatives for youthful 
offenders as early as the 1960s and 1970s. Under these arrangements, 
states paid for the costs of community-based programs while charging 
local jurisdictions for confinement, sometimes on a sliding scale. 
The less severe a juvenile’s offenses, the more money counties 
were required to pay for incarcerating that juvenile. States such as 
california, illinois, ohio, and Pennsylvania adopted varying forms of 
this model. 
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  Juvenile Justice Systems Have Their Own Language
Adjudication The court hearing in which a juvenile offender is judicially 
determined to have committed a delinquent offense. 
Similar to a finding of guilt. Youth found to be legally 
responsible for an offense are then referred to as having 
been adjudicated. 
decarceration An intentional process to reduce secure confinement 
through shorter sentences, expanded use of alternative 
sentencing, and policy directives.
deinstitutionalization Any effort to reduce the population of institutions or to 
reduce the processes that create dependency on 
institutional environments.
detention Temporary holding of an arrested juvenile in a secure 
facility to ensure the youth’s appearance at subsequent 
court hearings or to protect the public safety pending a 
final court disposition. 
disposition The court hearing in which a juvenile is ordered to comply 
with specific services and sanctions. Similar to imposition 
of sentence. the court orders resulting from the hearing 
are also referred to as the final disposition of a case. 
Realignment Reconfiguring the justice system to expand the roles and 
responsibilities of local government while reducing or even 
eliminating the direct control of state government, 
especially in secure confinement and residential 
placements. 
Reinvestment Using financial incentives to lower the demand for secure 
confinement of offenders and diverting the funds that 
would otherwise be spent on incarceration to:  
1) provide evidence-based and cost-effective alternatives
    for individual offenders; and/or  
2) improve conditions in high-crime communities.
Resolution Changing juvenile justice practice through leadership and 
direct managerial action and relying on those influences to 
sustain reforms in policy and procedure.
secure Facility A locked residential facility for adjudicated juveniles, 
ranging from therapeutically oriented facilities to 
prison-like correctional institutions.
| 10 |
The contemporary concept of justice reinvestment in the juvenile 
justice system began with the establishment of the California Youth 
Authority (cYA) in 1941 and enactment of the california Probation 
subsidy Act of 1965. lawmakers designed the cYA to provide access to 
secure placements for youth, but with the goal of keeping adjudicated 
youth close to home rather than being placed in state institutions 
by default. Probation became a conventional sentence for low-level 
offenders as counties finally had adequate resources and personnel to 
fund and operate probation programs. 
By the 1970s, however, probation officers were supervising more 
than three times the number of youth recommended by the national 
standards of the day, raising concerns that probation supervision and 
services were becoming ineffective. meaningful work with offenders 
became impractical because so much time was devoted to routine 
caseload management. Probation offices in California responded by 
referring more offenders to state correctional institutions. correctional 
populations rebounded, although the recidivism rate from the state’s 
correctional system was acknowledged to be nearly 50 percent (smith 
1972). State officials began to construct new institutions and to 
incarcerate more offenders—the opposite of what they had intended. 
cAliFoRniA PRoBAtion sUBsidY Act
To reassert the philosophy of community probation for both juveniles 
and adults, the california legislature enacted the Probation subsidy 
Act of 1965. The law offered financial incentives to local communities 
willing to utilize probation instead of state corrections. the program 
reestablished probation as the most cost-efficient method of dealing 
with at least one-quarter of offenders that would otherwise be sent to 
state institutions. legislators believed probation departments would 
respond positively to financial rewards for meeting their performance 
goals. The Probation Subsidy Act provided counties with $2,000 
to $4,000 in state funds for each otherwise eligible offender not 
committed to a state facility (smith 1972). 
the Probation subsidy Act succeeded on several levels. counties 
hired more probation officers, supervisors, support staff, and aides to 
provide offender supervision. the state shut down at least one secure 
institution. From 1965 to 1969, the percentage of convicted offenders 
sent to state prison dropped from 23 percent to 10 percent. more than 
45,000 offenders avoided state prison and were sentenced instead to 
community probation and rehabilitation programs. the 
subsidy Act established the practice of cost sharing 
between the state and counties (smith 1972). despite 
its successes, however, the program became gradually 
more expensive due to the rising number of offenders 
entering the system in the 1970s, many for drug-
related crimes. the programs and services intended 
to supplement probation were never implemented 
in full at the county level. in 1978, california ended 
the Probation subsidy Act and replaced it with a new 
program that provided grant funding to individual 
counties (nieto 1996). http://www.cdcr.ca.gov
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PennsYlVAniA Act 148
in 1970, Pennsylvania counties 
could either pay to supervise 
delinquent youth in their 
own communities or confine 
them at the state’s expense. 
local communities had little 
incentive to develop programming 
for adjudicated youth. With few 
treatment options available at the local level, judges were sometimes 
compelled to incarcerate youth who may have been suitable for 
community-based treatment. To give counties financial responsibility 
for their own placement decisions, Pennsylvania adopted Act 148 in 
1976. the law required counties to cover 40 percent of the costs of 
sending youth to state facilities but as little as 20 percent of the costs 
of community-based intervention (Aryna et al. 2005). The intent of the 
policy was to provide counties with financial incentives to develop local 
services for at-risk youth. 
Act 148 demonstrated success within its first decade. By 1984, youth 
placements in confinement declined 24 percent while placements 
in community programs increased 20 percent and placements 
in day treatment programs grew 52 percent. state subsidies for 
local programming increased from $65 million to $114 million. The 
expanded reimbursement for community services allowed counties 
greater flexibility to develop programs that kept youth in their own 
homes during court-ordered treatment (Aryna et al. 2005). 
The financial mechanisms associated with Act 148, however, 
concerned both state and county officials. The state worried that 
county spending would exceed projections while the counties feared 
being locked into fixed budgets if state supports were depleted prior 
to the end of a fiscal year. In the early 1990s, an amendment to Act 
148 established needs-based planning and budgeting. Under the new 
system, Pennsylvania counties developed a plan of service needs and 
submitted the cost of the services in advance. this approach allowed 
counties greater flexibility and it gave the state better information for 
budgetary oversight.
wisconsin YoUtH Aids
In 1981, Wisconsin began to hold counties financially responsible for 
juvenile placements and to offer financial support for counties willing 
to fund local programming for delinquent youth. Before 1981, the 
state paid for juvenile placements in secure facilities, but counties 
were responsible for all funds required to serve youth in their home 
communities. in an effort to reverse these incentives, the department 
of Juvenile corrections (dJc) launched wisconsin Youth Aids. 
The goal of Youth Aids was to decentralize the financial management of 
juvenile justice by distributing funds to counties in proportion to their 
investments in community-based services. The formula for dispersing 
funds to local governments incorporated three factors: each county’s 
total youth population, its proportion of the state’s total number of 
juvenile arrests, and the proportion of secure placements coming from 
http://www.dpw.state.pa.us
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that county. the state agreed to bill individual counties 
for the cost of each juvenile placed in a state facility, and 
any remaining funds were to be used for local programs. 
By 1997, the Youth Aids program accounted for 45 
percent of county spending on delinquency services. 
to cover their share, the counties used revenue from 
property taxes and grants as they had before, but 
Youth Aids greatly expanded their resources (stuiber 
et al. 1999). Judges had more flexibility to commit 
adjudicated juveniles to in-home dispositions, including 
intensive supervision, electronic monitoring, individual 
and/or family counseling, vocational training, payment 
of restitution to victims, and victim-offender mediation. 
Out-of-home placements were reserved for juveniles who had 
committed serious or repeat offenses or for those with damaging 
home environments. Placements could vary in level of restrictiveness 
from minimal (e.g., foster homes and group homes) to severe (e.g., 
institutions and secure facilities). 
the Youth Aids program experienced ongoing funding challenges. 
Freezes in county allocations sometimes made it difficult for counties 
to address the rising costs of youth services. Also, counties at times 
were required to use more of their own funds than they expected 
to pay for services. these concerns compelled counties to search 
continually for outside grant revenue. despite these problems, Youth 
Aids was credited with reducing secure placements by 23 percent after 
the mid-1990s; in Milwaukee County alone commitments fell nearly 75 
percent between 1995 and 2005 (tyler, Ziedenberg and lotke 2006). 
Of course, juvenile crime was also falling during this time period. 
the key question is whether the decline in commitments would be 
sustainable under different conditions. 
ReclAim oHio
In 1993, Ohio launched an ambitious juvenile reinvestment strategy 
to reduce the number of commitments to state institutions. ReclAim 
ohio (Reasoned and equitable community and local Alternatives to 
the Incarceration of Minors) shifted the responsibility for juvenile 
incarceration to counties and empowered communities to treat 
offenders locally rather than in state institutions (moon, Applegate 
and Latessa 1997). The initiative relied on financial incentives to keep 
juveniles close to home. In the initial funding approach, counties were 
responsible for 75 percent of the daily rate for an institutional bed 
versus 50 percent of the daily rate for a community placement. 
ReclAim ohio soon demonstrated its potential to reduce 
juvenile commitment rates and to support community-
based programs. it was adopted statewide in 1995. the 
number of juveniles committed to institutions operated by 
the ohio department of Youth services (dYs) decreased 
nearly every year following the program’s inception. On the 
other hand, violent crime in ohio also declined during the 
late 1990s. Falling crime rates may have reduced the 




in fact, trend data show that the drop in commitments to dYs actually 
leveled off between 2005 and 2007, just after a brief increase in the 
juvenile violent crime rate between 2004 and 2006. The real test of 
ReclAim ohio could come if and when violent crime rates rebound.
Still, when the costs associated with arresting, adjudicating, and 
processing juvenile offenders were taken into account the RECLAIM 
Ohio initiative appeared to be cost-efficient (Lowenkamp and Latessa 
2005). the reinvestment approach used in ohio also appealed to 
policymakers of varying political perspectives as it provided judges 
with the ability to determine how individual juveniles were handled. 
it supported more rehabilitation and treatment to meet the needs of 
adjudicated youth, but judges retained the authority to incarcerate 
juvenile offenders as they saw fit. This probably facilitated the 
adoption of reforms. could it make them easier to dilute or repeal? 
descHUtes coUntY commUnitY YoUtH inVestment PRoJect 
In the mid-1990s, Deschutes County (which includes the city of 
Bend, Oregon) started a system known as “community justice,” which 
stressed community and victim involvement in the justice process, 
held government agencies accountable to citizens, and worked to 
repair the harms caused by crime. in 1997, as an extension of the 
community justice philosophy, Deschutes adopted new policies that 
led to the creation of the Community Youth Investment Project (CYIP). 






















1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Note: In all presentations of state-specific FBI arrest rates, under-age-18 arrests were obtained from Table 69 
in the annual FBI report, Crime in the United States. Rates were calculated after adjusting each year’s reporting 
population in Table 69 using the state’s total percentage of residents under age 18 according to the U.S. Census.
The falling number of juvenile commitments in Ohio largely mirrors 
the decline in violent juvenile crime
Juvenile commitments
Data sources: Ohio Department of Youth Services and FBI (Uniform Crime Reports), Crime in the United States.
* Number of youth (under age 18) arrested for FBI Violent Crime Index offenses per 1,000 youth ages 10-17 
   in the state population.
Juvenile  commitments  to the Ohio 
Department of Youth Services
Year
Juvenile  violent crime arrest rate in Ohio
Juvenile violent crime arrest rate*
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 Juvenile Justice Reinvestment Began in the 1970s
Pennsylvania Act 148  
1976
Required counties to pay 40% of institutional 
placement costs, but state reimbursed counties up 
to 80% for community-based services. 
wisconsin Youth Aids  
1981
Allocated juvenile justice funds to counties based 
on 3 factors: youth population, juvenile arrests, 
and secure placements. counties paid for state 
confinement. Remaining funds could be used for 
community-based services.  
ReclAim ohio  
1993
State provided counties with funds for community-
based juvenile services, but allocations decreased 
as the number of youth sent to state facilities 
grew. Funding methods continued to evolve.
deschutes county, oregon 
community Youth invest-
ment Program (cYiP)  
1997
State reimbursed county 100% for each juvenile 
not sent to a state facility who otherwise would 
have been eligible for confinement. County used 
the funds to provide prevention programs and 
community-based treatment for adjudicated youth. 
north carolina Juvenile 
crime Prevention councils  
1998
established a JcPc in each county to oversee lo-
cal juvenile justice services. The state reimbursed 
counties for up to 90% of the costs of community-
based programs. 
Redeploy illinois  
2004
counties received added funding for community 
programs if they reduced juvenile commitments to 
state facilities by 25% within the first year.  
california senate Bill 681   
2007
counties paid variable fees to the state for costs 
of juvenile confinement. Fees were higher for 
youth committed for less serious offenses.  
texas commitment  
Reduction Program (cRP) 
2009
state expanded funding for counties that used 
evidence-based programs to intervene with youth 
offenders locally rather than relying on the state’s 
secure confinement facilities. 
 Realignment Initiatives Emerged in 2000
wayne county (mi)   
Juvenile services Reform  
2000
Established a private juvenile case management 
system to replace the public probation agency. 
divided county into geographic service zones, with 
one private provider assuming responsibility for all 
juvenile services in each zone, including residential 
placement. state matched funds the county spent 
on juvenile services. 
california senate Bill 81, 
Partial Realignment  
2007
counties assumed responsibility for all young 
offenders except those charged with a designated 
list of violent offenses. the state provided block 
grants to counties to develop adequate programs 
and services at the local level. 
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treatment and prevention programs for adjudicated and 
at-risk juveniles. It introduced strong incentives through 
state refunds to the county for costs that would have 
been incurred as a result of incarceration (approximately 
$48,000 annually per youth). The county used two-thirds 
of the reimbursements to treat juveniles in the community 
and invested the remaining funds in prevention programs 
(maloney and Holcomb 2001).
the cYiP appeared to be effective given the 78 percent 
drop in institutional beds that followed. the county 
saved and reinvested $2 million in community-based 
programs within the first three years, and 49 percent of juveniles in 
the program were on pace to graduate high school with another 20 
percent earning their ged while enrolled in the program (maloney 
and Holcomb 2001). Over the past decade, juvenile crime decreased 
despite a consistent growth in the county population, delinquent 
referrals decreased 12.5 percent, and the juvenile recidivism rate 
decreased nine percent (deschutes county 2010). 
subsequent evaluations, however, have yielded mixed results. An 
outside evaluation found that while the program was more cost-
effective than state institutional placement, the recidivism rate of 
juveniles who completed the program was slightly higher (67 percent) 
than youth released from state custody (58 percent). on the other 
hand, the sample size of the study was small and the two samples 
compared by researchers were not carefully matched on relevant 
characteristics. the evaluators concluded that the results were not 
robust (Hannay 2004). in terms of recidivism for serious offenses 
alone, however, the youth managed through CYIP re-offended slightly 
less often than those released from state institutions (gest 2002). 
noRtH cARolinA JUVenile cRime PReVention coUncils
Until the late 1990s, juvenile justice responsibilities in North Carolina 
were split between two departments. to improve oversight and 
efficiency, the state passed the Juvenile Justice Reform Act in 1998. 
the Act created the department of Juvenile Justice and delinquency 
Prevention (dJJdP), which assumed the duties of the two former 
departments. [note: in 2011, the state announced that it intended 
to merge the department into an even larger public safety agency.] 
the dJJdP was charged with developing prevention, intervention, and 
rehabilitative programs targeting at-risk youth, and devising a formula 
to determine the amount of funding each county should receive to 
spend on community-based services (Mason 1999). 
the Juvenile Justice Reform Act required each county 
to establish a Juvenile crime Prevention council (JcPc) 
that would act as the administrative body in charge of 
local planning. each JcPc included community members 
as well as criminal justice and other local government 
personnel, counselors, health and treatment providers, 
and non-profit representatives. In addition to evaluating 
current programs and developing new strategies to 




state funding to support community-based programming for delinquent 
juveniles (Mason 1999). Programs could address individual, family, and 
academic risk factors. If a county’s funding request was approved, the 
state required the county to match between 10 percent and 30 percent 
of its total allocation.
Following passage of the Juvenile Justice Reform Act, juvenile 
commitments in north carolina fell dramatically. the number of 
juveniles committed to the state dipped to 357 in 2010 from 1,360 in 
1998 (north carolina department of Juvenile Justice and delinquency 
Prevention 2011). while this was due at least in part to the overall 
crime decline, the drop in commitments was steeper than the falling 
rate of youth violence. 
commitments continued to fall after the decline in violence slowed, 
suggesting that reductions in confinement were not simply a reaction 
to falling crime. As in ohio, however, commitments in north carolina 
stabilized between 2005 and 2008, just as violent youth crime grew 
slightly. it will be important for policymakers and practitioners to 
monitor this relationship in the future. 
RedePloY illinois
modeled after ReclAim ohio, Redeploy illinois began in 2004 as a 
pilot program in four counties. the goal of the pilot was to reduce 
youth commitments to state facilities. Prior to launching the Redeploy 
program, the state simply paid for juvenile commitments coming from 
Illinois counties. The costs of institutional care averaged $70,000 
annually for each offender, and in the early 2000s the state of illinois 
spent more than $100 million per year incarcerating approximately 

















1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
north carolina commitments temporarily stopped falling when violent 
crime grew between 2004 and 2007
Juvenile commitments
Data sources: North Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention and FBI (UCR).
* Number of youth (under age 18) arrested for FBI Violent Crime Index offenses per 1,000 youth ages 10-17 in 
   the state population. The FBI does not publish arrest data for youth under age 16 at the state level.
Youth violent crime arrest rate (under age 18)
Year
Youth violent crime rate*
Juvenile  commitments (under age 16)
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facilities were charged with non-violent 
offenses. Nearly one-third of all juveniles were 
committed for short-term court evaluations 
(illinois Juvenile Justice initiative 2008). 
the Redeploy initiative allocated state funds 
to participating counties for the provision of 
treatment and intervention programs for at-
risk youth (excluding some violent crimes). 
the state reimbursed counties for the cost of 
managing adjudicated youth at the local level. Individual sites received 
approximately $6,000 annually for each youth, but to be eligible and to 
receive funding, counties needed to reduce institutional commitments 
25 percent in the first year (Illinois Juvenile Justice Initiative 2006). 
Redeploy illinois encouraged broader county participation in 
community-based services for juvenile offenders. Individual counties 
were free to devise and structure their programming for juvenile 
offenders as long as they adhered to a few basic goals: to reduce 
reliance on correctional institutions, protect communities, hold youth 
accountable, and provide youth with opportunities to succeed (illinois 
Juvenile Justice initiative 2008). counties used a wide variety of 
rehabilitative programming, including but not limited to educational 
advocacy, employment services, home detention, aggression 
replacement training, mental health treatment, substance abuse 
treatment, family support services, and community restorative boards. 
The initiative showed promise in its first year, possibly avoiding 
more than $2 million in incarceration costs not including the 
potential savings from lowered recidivism (illinois Juvenile Justice 
initiative 2008). within three years, the pilot counties had reduced 
commitments to state institutions by 51 percent. the initiative was 
expanded to 23 more of the state’s 102 counties. 
texAs ReinVestment
In 2007, Texas faced prison construction needs with a price tag of $2 
billion (Right on crime 2010). the state legislature opted instead to 
invest in alternatives. Texas officials allocated $241 million to expand 
substance abuse and mental health treatment for offenders inside 
and outside of prison. over the next two years, the number of crimes 
dropped, as did probation and parole revocations. The state adjusted 
its prison projections to just 10 percent of previous estimates (Council 
of state governments Justice center 2009). 
In recent years, the Texas Youth Commission (TYC) charged $93,864 
to place one youth in a secure facility for a single year (levin 2008). 
The one-year re-arrest rate for youth released from TYC was 57 
percent, and the three-year re-incarceration rate fluctuated between 
47 percent and 52 percent. Policymakers believed the tYc needed 
significant transformation. In 2007, the Texas legislature passed 
senate Bill 103, which was modeled after ReclAim ohio and promised 
a more cost-effective method of handling adjudicated youth. [By 2011, 
the state promised even more change, announcing a plan to merge 
the texas Youth commission and Juvenile Probation commission to 
form a new juvenile justice agency.]
http://www.dhs.state.il.us
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to ease the costs of youth incarceration, 
senate Bill 103 prohibited institutional 
commitments for misdemeanor offenders. 
It provided counties with financial 
incentives to manage delinquent youth 
locally and funded more programs that 
could serve as effective alternatives to 
incarceration. The legislation provided $58 
million to county probation departments 
to support youth services and to handle 
adjudicated youth at the local level (Levin 2010a). 
the effects were immediate. two tYc facilities closed and reduced 
the state budget by $115 million (Right on Crime 2010). Local 
officials placed 53 percent fewer juveniles in state institutions during 
the next three years — saving another $100 million. Nearly half 
the expenditures avoided by texas counties were returned to local 
probation departments to keep even more youth from being placed in 
tYc facilities.  
in 2009 the texas Juvenile Probation commission (tJPc) implemented 
the commitment Reduction Program (cRP) to provide counties 
with the ability to obtain state funds for community-based youth 
programming. the funds were available only for counties pledging 
to reduce commitments and to rely on evidence-based programs 
as alternatives. subsequent funding amounts were based on each 
county’s effectiveness, including its juvenile recidivism rate. In the 
following year, commitments to tYc fell nearly 40 percent, due at least 
in part to the cRP (levin 2010b). 
ReAlignment models
Resolution and reinvestment strategies focus on influencing the 
decisions of administrators and policymakers, either through direct 
persuasion or financial incentives. Both strategies can be effective 
in reforming juvenile justice policies and practices, as this report 
has demonstrated. Both strategies, however, are vulnerable to being 
reversed when the policy environment changes. 
Realignment focuses on structural arrangements. it promises to 
reconfigure organizations and systems on a permanent basis. 
structural characteristics, of course, can also be changed, but 
it is more difficult to undo reforms implemented with structural 
change than to reverse procedural alterations that were designed to 
accommodate an existing structure. when system reform involves the 
elimination of agencies and the demolition of buildings, it is harder to 
go back to the old way of doing business. 
wAYne coUntY, micHigAn
Prior to 2000, juvenile justice services in Wayne County were managed 
much like they were in other states. the county accessed secure 
confinement by committing young offenders to state-run facilities. 
Juvenile court judges had few local options for handling adjudicated 
youth. commitments, however, were supported with state funds. this 
resulted in excessive use of out-of-home placement. 
http://www.tyc.state.tx.us
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in the 1990s, the average daily population of state 
commitments from wayne county was 700 with 
another 200 youth held in facilities outside michigan 
(wayne county children & Family services 2010a). 
Wayne County spent up to $150 million each year to 
incarcerate juvenile offenders (Latona, Smith & Chaney 
2006). An audit by the state Auditor general in 1999 
indicated a variety of problems surrounding state 
juvenile facilities, including escalating costs and high 
recidivism rates. Two-thirds of incarcerated juveniles 
returned to the system within six months of release. 
The apparent philosophy of juvenile justice was 
incapacitation in lieu of rehabilitation. in short, 
the juvenile justice system in Wayne County was not achieving its 
officials goal— helping juveniles to finish school, secure jobs, and avoid 
additional justice involvement. 
County officials then signed an agreement with the Michigan 
department of Human services to shift the responsibility for 
managing adjudicated youth to the county from the state. Funds 
saved from reductions in institutional commitments were invested 
in local programs. Using a mix of local and state funds, the county 
implemented a completely new structure for delivering juvenile 
services. The Juvenile Assessment Center/Care Management 
Organization (JAC/CMO) system was a totally privatized system in 
which substance abuse and mental health providers teamed with case 
managers and youth workers to provide all services and supervision 
for juvenile offenders (Wayne County Children & Family Services 
2010a). 
The county’s JAC became the entry point for all juveniles referred by 
law enforcement. After a preliminary assessment by the JAc, each 
juvenile was referred to one of five CMOs. Each CMO was responsible 
for a distinct section of the county and that cmo had complete 
freedom to create and manage a Plan of care for every youth referred 
from that area, including case management and all interventions for 
juveniles and their families. The county provided the necessary funding 
through contracts with the five CMOs. In addition to overseeing all 
community-based services, the CMOs were responsible for placing 
juveniles in secure or non-secure residential facilities whenever 
placement was needed.
The county developed a web-based Juvenile Agency Information 
system to enable all the relevant parties to monitor daily services, 
ensure compliance with court orders, and assess the program’s 
successes and weaknesses (wayne county children & Family services 
2010a). the system ensured accountability by requiring the JAc, an 
independent and non-profit agency, to monitor and review the CMOs 
every six months and to authorize changes in service when necessary. 
the reforms helped the county transition from a system focused 
on state-funded placement to one focused on local supervision and 
treatment. to provide local accountability, the county assumed half the 
costs of any remaining placements in state facilities (wayne county 
children & Family services 2010a). 
http://www.co.wayne.mi.us
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the reforms in wayne county would likely not have been possible 
without a reliable source of funding. Michigan’s Child Care Fund 
is an uncapped, 50/50 cost-sharing agreement between the state 
and the county. to be eligible for these funds, wayne county was 
required to submit an annual program plan and budget proposal to 
the department of Human services. if approved, the county received 
state reimbursement for half the costs of any juvenile services covered 
under the plan (wayne county children & Family services 2010a). 
eligible services included needs assessments, education supports, 
substance abuse treatment, mental health services, and family 
interventions (wayne county children & Family services 2010b). the 
county could draw heavily on other funding sources as well, including 
Federal Title IV-E funds, which can be claimed for economically 
deprived juveniles, and Medicaid, which can be used to cover the costs 
of many healthcare and behavioral health services. 
the new system was quite successful. in 1999, the state and county 
together spent $113 million on residential care alone for Wayne County 
youth. By 2010, the five CMOs combined spent $88 million for all 
juvenile services (Wayne County Children & Family Services 2010a). 
the number of youth in state facilities declined sharply. the average 
daily population of Wayne County juveniles in state facilities dropped 
from 731 youth in 1998, to 40 youth in 2003, to just two youth in 
2010 (wayne county children & Family services 2010b). moreover, 
by 2010 no young offenders from Michigan were being held in out-of-
state facilities. only a decade earlier, 200 michigan youth at any given 
time were confined in other states. Wayne County’s reforms helped 
the county and the state to reduce cost expenditures, eliminated the 
state institutional population, and established a new structure for 
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the realignment initiative in wayne county virtually eliminated 
juvenile placements in state training schools
Average daily population in training schools
Data sources: Wayne County Children and Family Services (2010a, p. 5) and FBI (UCR, annual, Table 8). Offense data 
prior to 2005 are adjusted to match subsequent years (see Table 8 notes in FBI reports).
  * Total number of FBI Violent Crime Index offenses reported (all ages) per 1,000 city residents. The FBI does not
     publish juvenile arrest data for individual cities.
** Average daily populations used because data for the flow of commitments were not available from Wayne County. 
Total violent crime offense rate in Detroit, Michigan
Year
Average daily population of Wayne County 
youth in Michigan state training schools**
Violent crime offense rate*
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cAliFoRniA senAte Bill 81
By the 1980s the dominant philosophy of California juvenile justice had 
shifted from treatment to incarceration as lawmakers reacted to public 
fears of rising crime. During this period, the population of juveniles in 
cYA custody grew steadily, surpassing 10,000 by 1996. the increases 
led to crowding and deteriorating conditions in cYA facilities, including 
several deaths and 23 hour-a-day lockdowns (Krisberg et al. 2010). 
the rising costs, appalling conditions, and pressure from litigation 
compelled the state to make changes in juvenile justice policy and 
practice. 
In the early 1990s, the State of California shouldered the majority of 
costs for youth placed in CYA facilities. Counties paid as little as $25 
per month to hold one juvenile in CYA custody (Krisberg et al. 2010). 
the california legislature introduced a requirement for counties to pay 
for youth placements on a sliding scale. the new system was based 
on financial incentives. Counties sending violent or serious offenders 
to the CYA paid a small flat fee, but counties sending offenders 
adjudicated for minor offenses such as drug possession paid up to 100 
percent of the costs of commitment. 
  New York Considers Realignment
late in 2010, mayor michael Bloomberg and newly elected 
Governor Andrew Cuomo each visited some of New York State’s 
fully staffed but nearly empty juvenile correctional facilities. 
mayor Bloomberg was struck by the costly and antiquated 
facilities, which he called “relics of a bygone era, when troubled 
city kids were stripped from their families and shipped to 
detention centers in remote rural areas” (Bloomberg 2010). 
state and local policymakers began new discussions about 
a realignment strategy similar to the models implemented 
in wayne county and california. lawmakers had previously 
considered reinvestment bills known as “Redirect New York” 
and “Reinvest New York.” The laws would have expanded state 
support of alternatives and required the savings to be invested in 
community programs (Fight crime: invest in kids 2011). 
Realignment in new York would be surprisingly feasible. the 
state could transfer responsibility for 60 percent of all committed 
juveniles to local jurisdictions simply by realigning juvenile 
justice in New York City; adding Rochester and Long Island would 
include nearly 90 percent of all commitments. A totally realigned 
system in new York city would need to be capable of receiving 
300-350 juveniles each year, far fewer than the number of cases 
handled successfully in wayne county, michigan. 
Officials in New York State agencies continued to doubt 
the capacity of service providers in some communities to 
accommodate total realignment, but lawmakers were exploring 
the concept and future changes were anticipated (governor 
Patterson Task Force 2009; Mattingly and Schiraldi 2010).
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The new incentives led to significant reductions in CYA commitments 
beginning in the mid-1990s, falling to fewer than 500 by 2005. Despite 
or perhaps because of this progress, the cost of sending a juvenile 
to an institution managed by the state agency (by then part of the 
california department of corrections and Rehabilitation) increased to 
$225,000 per year (Ferriss 2010). State regulations made it difficult to 
reduce staff despite diminishing correctional populations. 
in response, the california legislature changed tactics and enacted a 
realignment strategy. Senate Bill 81 transferred most juvenile justice 
responsibilities to counties. the purpose of the law was to remove all 
but the most violent juvenile offenders from state facilities and into 
local programs (little Hoover commission 2008). 
Implementation of realignment was sometimes difficult. Local 
probation departments may have had insufficient time to prepare. 
Existing programs had to be adjusted to accommodate the new class 
of juveniles being referred to county probation. Resources became 
strained during the transition. Because the criteria for placement 
depended largely on current offense rather than a youth’s previous 
record of offending, juveniles with violent criminal histories but non-
violent current offenses were eligible to be retained at the county 
level. in addition, no state entity was charged with overseeing 
county practices and counties were not required to report how state 
money was spent and whether outcomes were achieved as intended 
(Dawood 2009). Still, realignment changed California juvenile justice 
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California lowered juvenile commitments more than 80 percent, and 
the reductions continued even when crime temporarily rebounded
Average institutional population
Data sources: California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and FBI (UCR).
* Number of youth (under age 18) arrested for FBI Violent Crime Index offenses per 1,000 youth ages 10-17.
Juvenile violent crime arrest 
rate in California
Year
Average population in CA institutions 
(Monthly counts averaged for each year)
Juvenile violent crime arrest rate*
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california realignment was the most successful statewide reform effort 
to date, and it appeared to be more resistant to crime fluctuations 
than were the reinvestment strategies pursued by other states. 
Between 2005 and 2007, the rate of juvenile violence in California 
increased nearly 20 percent before dropping again. during this 
fluctuation, the decline in juvenile commitments continued unabated. 
this suggests that system changes achieved through structural 
realignment may be more permanent than reforms generated through 
reinvestment strategies. 
california continued to build upon the success of realignment even 
after commitments dipped more than 80 percent. eventually, the state 
transferred responsibility for all non-violent youth to the counties. By 
2010, local jurisdictions were receiving nearly $100 million annually 
to supervise and  provide services for these youth. seven correctional 
facilities once operated by the state were closed, and the counties 
expanded their responsibility to include parole supervision for youth 
still being released from state facilities. in 2011, california governor 
Jerry Brown proposed closing the state youth corrections agency 
outright. Juvenile justice experts in California believed that complete 
realignment was all but inevitable (steinhart 2011).
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CONCLUSION  |
state and local governments in the United states draw upon an 
array of sanctions, services, and supports for youthful offenders. of 
all possible choices, the most consequential and expensive is secure 
confinement. Incarceration is always a central issue in juvenile justice 
policy and practice. In terms of public prominence, confinement is 
probably second only to policies that transfer youth out of the juvenile 
system and into the criminal (or adult) justice system. 
Like criminal court transfer, confinement is a gamble. Placing young 
offenders in secure facilities is an effective means of controlling their 
behavior for a short time, but its long-term impact is uncertain and 
research suggests that the unintended consequences may outweigh 
the benefits. For this reason, state and local governments try to 
restrict the use of confinement to cases in which it is demonstrably 
necessary. 
this report describes innovative strategies being used across the 
country to prevent the over-utilization of youth confinement. These 
strategies demonstrate that it is possible to reduce the size of state 
systems of youth incarceration. even when youth require some time in 
residential placement, they do not have to be sent away to correctional 
facilities hundreds of miles from their homes and families. they can be 
supervised and receive services in their own communities. if they must 
be confined for some time they can be maintained in smaller facilities 
managed by cities or counties. 
Implementing these strategies, of course, is not simple. Public officials 
hoping to improve the juvenile justice system with the strategies 
described in this report should attend to a number of important 
considerations. 
One of the first issues to arise in any debate about these reforms 
is equity. the reform strategies documented in this report may be 
received differently by small and large communities. large cities often 
favor such reforms because they have the resources to operate their 
own, independent juvenile justice systems, complete with secure 
placement options. smaller towns and rural areas, on the other hand, 
may not have the resources to provide appropriate interventions for 
every type of youthful offender. they need support from the state. 
Hybrid reform models could be one solution to the equity problem. 
in large urban areas that can afford to manage an entire range of 
intervention options for youthful offenders, a full realignment strategy 
may be most effective. in smaller communities, a reinvestment 
approach may be more effective as it would maintain some access 
to state resources. states could implement varying approaches 
depending on the sizes and locations of their local jurisdictions. 
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Another serious policy concern is the possibility that restricting the 
supply of juvenile confinement resources could inadvertently increase 
demand for criminal (adult) alternatives, including prison. this issue 
figured prominently in California’s preparations for realignment (Little 
Hoover commission 2008). Any effort to change policies and practices 
related to juvenile confinement must contend with the reasons that 
confinement is often over-utilized. 
Juvenile confinement is partly a rational attempt to guard the public 
safety and to reduce recidivism, but it is also partly a political and 
even an emotional response to the public’s fear of crime and the 
desire of policymakers to address that fear. Reducing access to secure 
confinement will not eliminate the desire for confinement. Reforming 
the juvenile justice system too aggressively or too rapidly may 
encourage justice officials to turn to the adult system.
Finally, changes in structure and policy can always have unintended 
consequences. the dramatic reforms in wayne county, for example, 
may have introduced new and unwanted incentives in the juvenile 
justice system. Some of the expanded funding sources in Wayne 
County’s realigned system were from behavioral health agencies that 
typically manage expenditures within diagnostic categories. it soon 
became customary in wayne county to speak of delinquent offenders 
in terms of their “disorders.” While appropriate in some cases, the 
pervasive use of behavioral health terminology in a juvenile justice 
context can create new forms of bias and stigma. Reformers must be 
careful to avoid replacing one set of negative incentives with another. 
states planning to implement the type of reforms described in this 
report should study the efforts of other jurisdictions and learn the 
lessons they provide. From the examples described here, it would 
seem that realignment is the preferred strategy for long-term 
change. Realignment strategies are likely to be more durable than 
either reinvestment or resolution strategies. whatever strategies 
they choose, state and local policymakers should pursue reform 
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